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Counterfeiting, illegal firearms, gambling and waste management: an 
exploratory estimation of four criminal markets 
This article focuses on four different criminal markets: namely, those of 
counterfeiting, illegal firearms trafficking, gambling and waste management. 
Despite recurrent allegations that these markets have a high mafia presence , 
there is a lack of reliable estimates of their sizes and the revenues that they 
generate. Figures in reports and media vary significantly, and the methods used to 
obtain them are often obscure. This study develops four different estimation 
methodologies with which to estimate the four criminal markets in Italy at the 
national and regional level. Considering that these are the first attempts to 
estimate these markets, the aim of the article is to stimulate debate on how to 
improve measurement of the crime proceeds from these criminal markets.  
Keywords: proceeds of crime; criminal markets; estimating illegal revenues; 
Italian mafias.  
 
1. Introduction 
This article describes exploratory methodologies with which to estimate the size and 
proceeds of four illegal markets: firearms trafficking, counterfeiting, gambling and 
waste management. Although these activities are very different from each other, there is 
a substantial lack of reliable estimates of their size in Italy and, frequently, abroad. The 
few estimates available often lack details on the main assumptions made and the 
methodologies used. The results are frequently impossible to verify and unreliable. This 
is particularly surprising because these illegal markets are frequently associated in the 
media and public opinion with criminal organizations and mafias. The lack of estimates 
hinders verification of the economic importance of such markets, as well as the claims 
made by the media and other sources.  
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Given the lack of reliable methods and transparently calculated estimates for the 
four illegal markets, this article produces exploratory estimations of the criminal 
revenues deriving from them in Italy at both the national and regional level.
1
 The 
purpose is not only to elaborate the first estimates in Italy relative to the mentioned 
criminal activities, but also, and more importantly, to stimulate a debate on the 
difficulties and possibilities of measuring criminal markets. In fact, the article proposes 
four different approaches suited to the specific features of each market and to the data 
available. The assumptions, data and methods are described in detail so that both 
replication and improvement are possible. 
In the next section, four sub-sections review current knowledge and estimates on 
the markets selected, with especial focus on the Italian situation. Section 3 describes the 
methodologies used to estimate the illegal revenues from each market and discusses 
their limitations. The fourth section presents and discusses the results. The last section 
concludes. 
2. Background on the four criminal market 
2.1. The illegal firearms market 
The most commonly used definition of firearms trafficking is set out in Article 3 of the 
United Nations Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in 
Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, where it is defined as “the 
import, export, acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or transfer of firearms, their parts 
and components and ammunition from or across the territory of one State Party to that 
of another State Party if any one of the States Parties concerned does not authorize it in 
accordance with the terms of this Protocol or if the firearms are not marked in 
accordance with article 8 of this Protocol”.  
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There are two frequently overlapping types of illegal firearms markets: the grey 
one (wherein illegal traffic is carried out by or for governments), and the black one 
(wherein trades take place outside state control).
2
 
Most weapons circulating in the black market come from the legal market and 
after diversion
3
 enter the illegal circuits.
4
 Illicit production (mostly by small-scale 
craftsmen) represents only a small share of the market.
5
 Conversely, authorized dealers, 
pawn shops, trade fairs and straw purchasers play a major role.
6
 
The involvement of criminal organizations usually consists in the provision of 
transport services and the establishment of contacts with international brokers in 
importing countries.
7
 Firearms are distributed both by highly organized criminal 
networks operating internationally and by criminal entrepreneurs operating on a small 
scale and at local level.
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There are only a few studies on the illegal firearms market, with rough estimates 
of its size and proceeds, and no details on the methodologies used.
9
 This lack of 
knowledge also implies that there is no common methodology for its estimation. 
Nevertheless, a number of international studies estimate the illegal firearms market at 
between 10% and 20% of the legal market.
10
  
The illegal firearms market in Italy 
Italy is a transit country for illegal weapons being trafficked to Northern Europe, and it 
is located on the route that starts from the former Yugoslavian countries.
11
 An 
investigative report has revealed that 90% of illegal firearms in Rome originate from the 
Balkans (especially Croatia).
12
 Weapons are carried in hidden compartments in cars, 
vans and trucks. Other supply channels are thefts from apartments or from security 
guards. An interview with an informant showed that retail prices on the black market 
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vary according to whether the firearm is new or second-hand (Table 1).
13
 
Table 1. Retail prices of some firearms circulating on the black market in Rome. Prices 
in euros. 
Model New Second-hand 
9x21 mm semi-automatic gun 1,700 700 
38 mm gun (special and revolver) 1,400 700 
Rifle 2,000 / 
Sub-machine gun 3,000 2,000 
Source: Angeli (2012) 
The most recent reports by Italian law enforcement agencies emphasizes the 
involvement of both Italian mafias (Cosa Nostra, 'Ndrangheta, Camorra and Sacra 
Corona Unita) and foreign criminal organizations (Slav, Russian, Albanian and African) 
in the trafficking of illegal firearms.
14
 The Italian mafias operate not only as traffickers 
but also as buyers to support their illegal activities. 
Only two sources provide rough estimates of the involvement of the mafias in 
the illegal firearms trade in Italy.
15
 Eurispes has estimated the 'Ndrangheta’s revenues 
from illegal firearms at €2.9 bn in 2007.16 SOS Impresa has estimated the revenues for 
all the major Italian mafias (Cosa Nostra, 'Ndrangheta, Camorra and Sacra Corona 
Unita) at €5.8 bn.17 However, the two sources do not provide any details on the 
estimation methods. Furthermore, they focus only on the Italian mafias, although it is 
well known that other criminal actors are involved in the market.
18
 These features 
suggest that these figures should be treated with caution. 
2.2. The illegal counterfeit market  
According to European Union Regulation 1383 of 2003, goods are counterfeits when 
they bear “without authorization a trade mark which is identical to a validly registered 
trade mark, or which cannot be distinguished in its essential aspects from such trade 
mark”. Drawing a distinction between the concepts of counterfeit and piracy is essential 
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for investigation of the illegal counterfeit market. Counterfeiting concerns the 
unauthorized use of an unregistered trademark identical to a registered one. Piracy 
concerns goods that are unauthorized copies of products protected by intellectual 
property law.
19
 
According to the World Customs Organization, the main destinations of seized 
counterfeits are the United States, Germany, Mexico, France and Japan.
20
 The main 
sources of counterfeits are in Asia, primarily China, Hong Kong and Taiwan.
21
 The 
most frequently seized products according to their value are clothing (16%), cigarettes 
(11%), sport shoes (10%) and bags, wallets and purses (9%).
22
 The sea route is used in 
81% of the shipments intercepted at the EU borders.
23
 
The role of organized crime in management of the illegal market for counterfeit 
products is now widely recognized. Interest in this market began in the 1970s with the 
enlargement of the sphere of illegal activities controlled by these organizations. The 
demand for illegal products was becoming increasingly diversified, so that mafias were 
provided with an opportunity to increase their profits through counterfeiting. The 
products could be easily distributed via the channels already used for other illicit goods 
such as drugs and cigarettes. Allegedly, the mafias most involved in the counterfeit 
market are the Chinese Triads, the Japanese Yakuza, the Neapolitan Camorra and the 
Russian Mafia.
24
 
At the international level, a number of studies have been conducted on 
counterfeiting, piracy and intellectual property protection.
25
 A few of these studies have 
attempted to quantify counterfeiting, mainly by using seizure data.
26
 The value of the 
international market for counterfeit and pirated products in 2005 was estimated at 
around $200 bn, excluding domestic production for domestic consumption and the 
volume of pirated digital products distributed via the internet.
27
 In 2007, the OECD 
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updated this estimate to $250 bn.
28
 The methodology for the estimation was based on 
seizure data and questionnaires administered to government agencies, customs, 
industries or business associations.  
The illegal market of counterfeit goods in Italy 
The illegal market of counterfeit goods in Italy is characterized by a close interaction 
between Italian and foreign mafias.
29
 The criminal groups most involved in this illegal 
market are the Chinese Triads, the Japanese Yakuza and the Neapolitan Camorra.
30
 
According to a recent Europol report, the entry and the subsequent distribution of 
counterfeit goods in Italy is made possible by close cooperation between Chinese 
criminal groups and Italian mafias, among which the Camorra and the 'Ndrangheta 
seem to predominate.
31
 
The counterfeits market has been estimated at between 5% and 10% of world 
trade, with a midpoint estimate of around 7%, which is also in line with the WCO, the 
OECD and the European Commission estimates.
32
 The revenues of the Italian 
counterfeit market are estimated at €7 to €8 bn. Confesercenti states that, in recent 
years, the volume of the market has almost doubled; more than 50% of the revenues are 
attributable to clothing and fashion, followed by music, audio-visual and software 
piracy.
33
 There are no details about the methodology of this study, although it appears to 
have been based on seizures, surveys, and other studies. In 2007, Confcommercio 
carried out a comprehensive data collection project. It used four focus groups to 
investigate the reasons for purchasing counterfeit products and conducted a survey of 
2,000 CATI interviews to shed light on the market for counterfeit clothing, accessories 
and multimedia. It estimated the market at about €3.3 bn (2 for clothing, 1.2 for fashion 
accessories and 0.13 for multimedia products).
34
 Another study estimated the damage 
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suffered by businesses and government revenues in Italy for 2001 by surveying 
companies from ten sectors at risk of counterfeiting.
35
 The damage to businesses was 
estimated at around €4.2 bn for 2001, while the revenue losses were around €1.5 bn.36 A 
study based on seizures by the Guardia di Finanza has estimated the counterfeits market 
at between €3 and €5 bn.37 CENSIS estimated a turnover of €7.1 bn in 2008 (domestic 
market only). The value comprises revenue losses, including direct and indirect taxes, at 
€5.3 bn.38 The findings of most recent CENSIS report are consistent with these previous 
estimates, even if the domestic market has slightly decreased. In addition, it estimated 
that the legal production of an equal amount of goods would earn additional tax 
revenues of €1.7 bn, whereas, on considering the induced production, it would be €4.6 
bn, or 1.74% of the total state revenues from the relevant taxes.
39 
 
2.3. The illegal gambling market 
“Gambling” includes different wagering systems such as casino games, bets, lotteries 
and gaming machines. Gambling is also a legal, though heavily regulated, business. 
Indeed, the literature focuses mostly on legal gambling and the relations with the 
commission of crimes.
40
 There are no studies assessing the proceeds of illegal gambling 
at the global or national level. 
Illegal gambling often reflects the functioning of the legal market. For example, 
a study on illegal sports bookmakers showed that the illegal businesses were structured 
like legal ones and operated in a similar manner according to competitive market 
dynamics.
41
 
Illegal gambling is often associated with organized crime, and it is claimed that 
criminal organizations have control over or monopolize the sector. Reuter and 
Rubinstein conducted a study to verify this claim by focusing on lotteries, betting and, 
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to a lesser extent, loan sharking in New York.
42
 They demonstrated that the sector was 
not in fact controlled by organized crime. Liddick criticized their results, arguing that 
the role of organized crime is not so marginal and
 
that there is no sharp distinction 
between legal and illegal activities, which are often arranged along a continuum of 
different levels of illegality.
43
 
Illegal gambling in Italy 
In Italy, the legal gambling market has expanded in recent decades due to the 
introduction of new games and services. In 2011 it generated a total of €79.8 bn, of 
which approximately €7-8 bn consisted of taxes. The Autonomous Administration of 
State Monopolies (AAMS) is the Italian public agency responsible for management of 
the gambling sector and for the publication of data. 
The growth of legal gambling has stimulated greater attention to its illegal side. 
This includes counterfeit games (such as "scratch and win" coupons), the management 
of unauthorized bet collection points, illegal lotteries, illegal gambling houses and the 
alteration of gaming machines.
44
 Various sources have highlighted the role of mafias in 
this sector. In a 2011 report, the Parliamentary Antimafia Commission analyzed mafia 
infiltration in legal and illegal gambling,
45
 finding that mafias manage bingo, 
clandestine casinos, gaming machines, illegal betting on football matches and horse 
racing, including online betting.
46
 Bets are managed primarily by unauthorized foreign 
bookmakers. Fake or irregular lotteries are also common means to launder money.
47
 In 
2010 at least thirty law enforcement operations focused on gambling and organized 
crime (with arrests and seizures in a number of Italian cities).
48
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Among the various gambling systems, gaming machines are the most important, 
yielding 50-60% of the total takings from legal gambling.
49
 Currently, there are two 
main types of gaming machines: new slot machines and video lottery terminals (VLT).
50
 
Several sources report the involvement of the Italian mafias and foreign criminal 
groups in illegal gaming machines. In particular, the three most important Italian mafias 
(Camorra, 'Ndrangheta and Cosa Nostra) have always shown an interest in control of 
such devices.
51
 The mafias control the installation and management of prohibited 
gaming machines, including the establishment of front companies, and they also force 
shops and premises to rent machines.
52
 Specifically, the National Antimafia Directorate 
2011 report states: “the mafias, without abandoning their traditional gambling halls and 
organization of toto nero, have concentrated on the most lucrative sectors of gaming, 
and therefore mainly on the management and alteration of machines”.53 The 
organization of gambling is also a typical activity of Chinese criminal organizations, 
which often use it as an extortion device, in particular towards Chinese nationals.
54
  
The 2007 report by the Commissione Grandi
55
 estimated the number of illegal 
slot machines in 2006 at 200,000.
56
 The report showed that two-thirds of the gaming 
machines were disconnected from the control network and achieved a turnover three 
times greater than that of devices controlled by the State.
57
 The Italian government 
reported that out of 87,050 inspected machines with cash prizes and 13,250 without 
cash prizes, 12,717 devices (13%) were irregular.
58
 However, since the end of 2010, the 
introduction of new types of gaming machines has led to a drastic reduction in the 
number of seizures, which in 2011 fell more than 6 times compared with 2009.
59
  
Despite the alleged importance of the sector, there are no reliable estimates of its 
actual size. According to a dossier compiled by Libera, the turnover of organized crime 
from illegal gambling amounts to more than €10 bn (€2.5 bn from football betting).60 
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Eurispes estimated the total volume of illegal gambling at around €23 bn, equaling 
13.1% of the entire turnover of the illegal economy.
61
 Sos Impresa gauged the revenues 
from illegal gambling at more than €4 bn (€3.6 bn directly managed by mafias).62 The 
differences among these estimates show that the size of the Italian illegal gambling 
market is in fact still unknown. Furthermore, the above-mentioned estimates do not give 
any clear information on the methodology used, so that it is impossible to verify their 
reliability and accuracy.  
2.4.  The illegal waste market 
Illegal activities related to the waste market are commonly defined as “any movement 
of waste which is not in accordance with environmental regulations”.63 They include the 
illegal management (i.e. storage, transfer or disposal) of waste, as well as its illegal 
trafficking.
64
 At the same time, these activities may occur both domestically and 
internationally.
65
 The illegal waste market is particularly difficult to measure because, 
like its legal counterpart, it is characterized by different types of waste and different 
phases in the management cycle. 
The illegal management and the illegal trafficking of waste are associated with 
several factors. The introduction of stricter regulations and the resulting increase in 
prices have been emphasized by many scholars,
66
 institutions
67
 and empirical studies.
68
 
The demand for illegal waste management and disposal services almost always comes 
from legitimate businesses.
69
 Waste producers seek cheap services to minimize costs 
and maximize revenues, and the illegal market is able to provide these services.
70
 Some 
estimates have reported that, at the end of the 1980s, the average disposal cost of one 
ton of hazardous waste was between $100 and $2,000 in an OECD country and between 
$2.5 and $50 in Africa.
71
 More recently, Italian sources have suggested that prices in the 
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illegal market are about one-fifth of those charged in the legal market.
72
 According to a 
study from the Netherlands, illegal prices would range between one-third and one-
fourth of the legal ones.
73
 
This situation has resulted in the waste being transported from industrialized 
countries for illegal dumping in developing countries. Criminal groups operating the 
illegal waste trafficking seem to have relatively simple structures. Institutional sources 
and law enforcement agencies describe small groups of five to ten people, who often 
have ethnic links with the destination countries.
74
 At the same time, it seems that the 
sector has attracted the growing interest of organized crime groups, owing to the 
opportunity to make high profits at low risks.
75
 However, the actual involvement of 
traditional organized crime groups in the illegal trafficking of waste is still a matter of 
debate.
76
 
In general, no study has reliably estimated the size of the illegal waste market. 
Most of the available data refer to the legal movements of waste.
77
 Information on the 
illegal waste market comes primarily from seizures and surveillance efforts, incidents 
and other forms of crime reporting. However, they are not representative of the actual 
size of the illegal market and are often of poor quality.
78
 
Illegal waste management in Italy 
Italy is a rather specific case because of the significant participation of the Italian mafias 
in the waste market.
79
 In particular, the Camorra seems to be directly involved in illegal 
waste activities. Cosa Nostra and the ‘Ndrangheta tend to use their intimidatory power 
and collusion with public officials to infiltrate the legal market.
80
 However, it would be 
a mistake to consider the illicit waste market in Italy as monopolized by the mafias. 
Individuals and companies not related with traditional mafias are equally involved in 
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the illegal management and trafficking of waste.
81
 In many cases they are “white collar 
criminals”, in particular entrepreneurs and brokers, but also chemists, engineers and 
analysts.
82
 These actors constitute what the Italian Antimafia Directorate (DNA) has 
recently called the “elite of illegal waste trafficking”.83 Stable partnerships between this 
“elite” and the traditional mafias may, or may not, be established. Moreover, the illegal 
waste market has now extended nationwide, and can no longer be considered a localized 
problem limited to the regions of origin of the mafias.
84
  
Owing to these specificities, Italy has become quite sensitive to the issue of 
“illegal waste” compared with other European countries.85 Since 2005, a specific 
section of the DNA reports has focused on criminal activities related to the illegal 
management and trafficking of waste. Information on the “illegal waste cycle” is 
periodically provided also by the environmental organization Legambiente as part of its 
annual report “Ecomafia”. Despite this attention, reliable estimates of the actual scale of 
the Italian illegal waste market do not exist. In 2011, Legambiente estimated the 
turnover from the illegal market of special waste at €3.1 bn.86 However, this figure 
should be interpreted with caution, since it was calculated on the basis of the price of 
legal of waste management and disposal services and may thus have been 
overestimated.
87
 In fact, the illegal market can guarantee significant savings compared 
with the legal one. 
3. Methodologies 
Owing to the absence of reliable methodologies for the estimation of the four criminal 
markets, the study reported in what follows developed different solutions for each of 
them.  
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3.1. Estimating the revenues from the illegal firearms market 
The study calculated the revenues of the illegal firearms market using a supply-
based and demand-based approach. Depending on the data available, estimates were 
calculated for 2010 at both the national and regional level. 
The supply-based approach assumed that firearms seized/confiscated 
corresponded to 8% of the total market.
88 
Owing to the lack of figures on the firearms 
market, the assumption was based on the incidence of seizures in the volume of the drug 
market (between 8% and 10%) and of the illicit tobacco market (10% in 2009, 8% in 
2010 and 5% in 2011).
89
 The national illegal revenues were calculated as follows: 
 Illegal revenues Supply = 
N. of firearms seized/confiscated · 100
8
 · € 1,579  
 
As regards demand, minimum and maximum values were produced. The 
demand-based approach assumed the illegal firearms market to be 10% or 20% of the 
legal market. This amount was determined by the value of exports (foreign demand), 
imports, and the turnover generated by the national market (domestic demand).
90
 
Estimation was based on the following formulas: 
Illegal revenues Demand min = (Export + Import + Turnover Italian market) ∙ 0,1  
Illegal revenues Demand max = (Export + Import + Turnover Italian market) ∙ 0,2 
National estimates were divided among the twenty Italian regions in proportion to their 
resident populations, according to the following formulas:
91
  
Illegal revenues Supply
reg
= 
Illegal revenues Supply
nat
 ∙ Population
reg
Population
nat
 
Illegal revenues Demand min
reg
= 
Illegal revenues Demand min
nat
 ∙ Population 
reg
Population
nat
 
Illegal revenues Demand max
reg
= 
Illegal revenues Demand max
nat
 ∙ Population
reg
Population
nat
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The regional revenues thus obtained were then adjusted to take account of the different 
incidence of the illegal market within each region.
92
 For this purpose, the regional illicit 
revenues were multiplied by the ratio between the rates of firearms seized/confiscated 
per 100,000 inhabitants at regional and national level. Estimates were calculated as 
follows:
93
 
Revenues
adj_Supply
reg
= Illegal revenues Supply
reg
. (
Rate firearms seiz/conf per 100,000 inhab
reg
Rate firearms seiz/conf per 100,000 inhab
nat
) 
Revenues
adj_Demand
reg
=Illegal revenues Demand
reg
 . (
Rate firearms seiz/conf per 100,000 inhab
reg
Rate firearms seiz/conf per 100,000 inhab
nat
) 
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3.2. Estimating the revenues from the illegal counterfeit market 
In general, studies estimating the counterfeit goods market have only calculated 
revenues based on the goods seized, or they have produced figures without specifying 
the methodology used. Given the lack of an established methodology in the literature, 
this study estimates the revenues of the illegal counterfeiting market by taking into 
account the turnover of companies in the sectors most at risk of counterfeiting and the 
workforce in those sectors. Estimates are for year 2008 due to the unavailability of more 
recent data.
 94
  
The first step was identification of the economic sectors most at risk of 
counterfeiting in Italy and calculation of their legal annual turnovers. The analysis 
identified the categories of goods most at risk among those listed in the IPERICO 
database because they are more likely to be seized. IPERICO collects information on 
counterfeited goods by commodity macro-categories seized by the Italian law 
enforcement agencies. Each commodity macro-category listed in the IPERICO database 
was associated with an ATECO economic sector of the retail market in order to 
calculate the turnovers of the companies belonging to this economic sector and to 
estimate the total legal turnover of each sector at national level.
 95
 Table 2 shows the 
various macro-categories listed in the IPERICO database, and the ATECO economic 
sectors that were connected to those categories to calculate the turnover of each sector 
in 2008.
 96
 This calculation was performed for all the commodity macro-categories s: 
Legal Market
s
= ∑ Company turnover ∈ s 
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Table 2. IPERICO product groups and corresponding ATECO economic sectors 
PRODUCT GROUP CORRESPONDING ATECO SECTOR 
Clothing 4,771: retail sale of clothing in specialized shops 
4,772: retail sale of footwear and leather items in specialized shops 
4,782: retail street sale of textiles, clothing and footwear 
Accessories of clothing 
Footwear 
Electrical equipment 4,754: retail sale of electrical equipment in specialized shops 
IT equipment 4,741: retail sale of computers, peripheral devices, software and office 
equipment in specialized shops 
CD, DVD, tape 4,763: retail sale of music and video recordings in specialized shops 
Toys 4,765: retail sale of toys in specialized shops 
Glasses 32,504: production of ophthalmic lenses 
32,505: production of frames of different types; mass-produced frames 
of ordinary glasses 
Watches and jewels 4,777: retail sale of watches and jewels in specialized shops 
Perfumes and cosmetics 4,775: retail sale of cosmetics, perfumes and herbalist items in 
specialized shops 
 
The second step consisted in calculating 5% and 10% of the total legal turnover 
of each sector. Indeed, according to the literature, the counterfeit market has a global 
value of between 5% and 10% of the total trade. These figures enabled calculation of 
the minimum and maximum estimates of the total illegal revenues for each commodity 
macro-category at national level, as the following formulas summarize: 
Illegal Market max
s
= 0.1 ∙ Legal Market
s
 
Illegal Market min
s
= 0.05 ∙ Legal Market
s
 
In the third step, the national estimates by commodity macro-category were 
redistributed among the twenty Italian regions using the number of employees and 
considering each ATECO economic sector at regional level in 2007. It was assumed 
that the regions with the highest number of employees also have larger markets, both 
legal and illegal. Calculation was made of the percentage of the number of employees in 
each region by commodity macro-category on the total number of employees by 
category at national level, in order to identify which regions have the highest and which 
the lowest number of employees. The different percentages were then multiplied by the 
total value of the illegal national market, first according to the lowest estimate of 5% 
and then according to the maximum estimate of 10%, as shown by the following 
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formulas:  
Illegal Market max
s, reg
 =
No. employees
s, reg
No. employees
s, nat
·Illegal Market max
s
 
Illegal Market min
s, reg
 =
Num. employees
s, reg
Num. employees
s, nat
·Illegal Market min
s
 
3.3. Estimating the revenues from the illegal gambling market 
Considering the variety of illegal gambling activities and the lack of data on them, the 
study opted to focus exclusively on illegal gaming machines. This decision appeared 
acceptable in various respects. First, in 2011 gaming machines generated a turnover of 
€44.8 bn, which was more than 56% of the total turnover from legal gambling (€79.8 
bn). Lotteries followed at a distance, with €10.1 bn.97 Second, the DNA has recently 
stressed the crucial role of revenues from new slot machines and VLT machines for 
criminal organizations, suggesting that this may become the largest portion of the illicit 
gambling market.
98
 Finally, data on gaming machines are periodically published by 
AAMS. Given that the gambling supply is constantly changing, it was considered 
appropriate to limit the estimate to 2011, the most recent year for which data were 
complete. The choice of that year also made it possible to estimate the illicit market 
after the introduction of the new gaming machines: 2011 was the first year in which, in 
addition to new slot machines, also VLT machines were introduced. 
Estimation of the revenues from illegal gambling machines in 2011 moved 
through various stages. First calculated were the regional takings for new slot machines 
and VLTs. The national legal takings (total cash collected) from gaming machines of 
each type were distributed among the twenty Italian regions according to the ratio 
between the total regional takings and the total national takings:
99
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Takings new slots
reg
 =
Takings new slots 
nat
∙ Total takings 
reg
Total Takings nat 
 
Takings VLTs
reg
 =
Takings VLTs 
nat
∙ Total takings 
reg
Total Takings nat 
 
Second, the study calculated the infringement rate. This was given by the ratio between 
the number of not merely-formal infringements and the number of machines 
inspected.
100
  
Infringement rate
reg
 =
not merely formal infringements
reg
inspected machines
reg
 
Third, the product of the infringement rate and the regional takings provided the 
regional illicit takings.
101
 The turnover was calculated in a differentiated way for new 
slot machines and VLTs.  
Illegal Takings new slots
reg
= Infringement rate
reg
∙ Takings new slots
reg
 
Illegal Takings VLTs
reg
= Infringement rate
reg
∙ Takings VLTsreg 
Fourth, the illegal revenues were derived from illegal takings. This derivation was based 
on a minimum and maximum hypothesis on the subdivision of the takings. In the legal 
market, takings from gaming machines are distributed as follows: payouts are 
determined by law (75% of takings for new slot machines and 85% for VLTs); 0.8% 
equal to the concession fee; state taxation (between 4% and 13% of takings); the rest is 
divided among distributors, managers, and retailers on the basis of private contracts.
102
 
The minimum estimate hypothesized that illegal machines may evade only part of the 
taxation and/or that a part of the takings would be distributed among retailers and 
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distributors. Accordingly, it assumed that revenues amount to 20% for new slot 
machines and 10% for VLTs. The maximum estimate assumed that illegal machines pay 
no taxes, no fees to retailers and distributors, and even have reduced payout rates (not 
excessively, since it may inhibit the players and be suspicious). In this case, revenues 
may be as high as 30% of the illegal takings for new slots and 20% for VLTs.  
Illegal Revenues new slots max 
reg
 = 0.3 · Illegal Takings new slots
reg
 
Illegal Revenues new slots min
reg
 = 0.2 · Illegal Takings new slots
reg
 
Illegal Revenues VLTs max 
reg
 = 0.2 · Illegal Takings VLTs
reg
 
Illegal Revenues VLTs min
reg
 = 0.1 · Illegal Takings VLTs
reg
 
The sum of max/min revenues from both types of machines yielded the maximum and 
minimum revenues from the illegal gaming machines market.  
Total Ill Rev max reg = Ill Rev new slots max reg+Ill Rev VLTs max reg  
Total Ill Rev min reg = Ill Rev new slots min reg+Ill Rev VLTs min reg  
3.4. Estimating the revenues from the illegal special waste market103 
The methodology used to estimate the illegal waste market drew in part on the approach 
developed by Legambiente, and it focused on the difference between legal waste 
production and management, assuming that this difference may be imputable to the 
illegal market. The estimation was limited to special waste and did not consider 
municipal waste, mostly entrusted to public companies, but also frequently infiltrated by 
the mafias (e.g. the infamous waste emergencies in Naples and Palermo).
104
 This 
methodological choice was made for various reasons. First, in 2010 (last available year) 
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special waste represented more than 80% of the total waste produced in Italy. Municipal 
waste, by contrast, accounted for less than 20%.
105
 Second, the illegal management of 
special waste seems to be particularly attractive to criminal operators, since it 
guarantees higher profits than the municipal waste.
106
 Finally, data on the production 
and management of special waste are periodically released by the Italian Institute for 
Environment Protection and Research (ISPRA).
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The study estimated the volume and revenues of the illegal market of special 
waste for the period 2007-2010 (mean of the four years). The estimates were performed 
at both the national and regional level, and they distinguished between hazardous and 
non-hazardous waste. The estimation consisted of various steps.  
First calculated was the legal management at regional level, i.e. the amount of 
special waste managed by legitimate facilities in each region (LMreg). The legal 
management was calculated as the sum of the special waste subject to final operations 
of recovery and disposal and the stock. The stock was the difference between stored 
waste in a given year and stored waste in the previous year:
108
  
LMregt=  Final Managregt
 + Stockregt  
Stockregt = Stored wasteregt  −  Stored wasteregt-1  
Second the legal management was adjusted on the basis of the amount of waste 
produced in each region (LMadjreg.).
109
 Two different coefficients were used, depending 
on the type of waste (hazardous/non-hazardous). For non-hazardous waste, the 
geographical macro-area (Northern, Central and Southern Italy) was considered.
110
 With 
regard to hazardous waste, the national figure was used.
111
  
LMadj(Non-haz)reg  = Legal Prodreg ∙
LMmacro-area
Legal Prod
macro-area
 
LMadj (Haz)reg  = Legal Prodreg ∙  
LMnat
Legal Prod
nat
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The volume of the illegal market (IMreg) was then estimated as the difference between 
legal production and legal management adjusted. 
IM (Non-haz)reg  = Legal Prodreg  - LMadj (Non-haz)reg  
IM (Haz)reg  = Legal Prodreg  - LMadj (Haz)reg  
Fourth, multiplying the illegal market by the average price of the legal services of waste 
management yielded the revenues of the illegal market at legal prices (Rev LPr) for 
both types of waste (hazardous/non-hazardous).
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Rev LPr(Non-haz)reg = IM (Non-haz)reg  ∙ €90,5 
Rev LPr (Haz)reg = IM (Haz)reg  ∙ €305 
The sum of the two yielded the revenues of the illegal special waste market at legal 
prices. 
Rev LPr TOTreg= Rev LPr(Non-haz)reg + Rev LPr (Haz)reg 
However, the literature suggests that the illegal market can guarantee significant 
savings. In particular, it seems that prices in the illegal market are between one-third 
and one-fifth of the legal ones. The revenues of the illegal market at legal prices were 
therefore divided by 3 (maximum value) and by 5 (minimum value) to calculate the 
revenues of the illegal waste market (Rev IM). 
Rev IM maxreg= 
Rev LPr TOTreg
3
 
Rev IM minreg= 
Rev LPr TOTreg
5
 
The maximum and minimum estimates were calculated for non-hazardous waste, 
hazardous waste, and the total. 
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3.5. Limitations 
Given the lack of previous estimations in the literature, the estimates of the four illegal 
markets should be considered as exploratory and, as such, treated with particular 
caution. Indeed, they have a number of limitations.  
First, owing to the lack of previous research, in some cases it was necessary to 
adopt assumptions and hypotheses without adequate empirical bases.
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Data availability and reliability was a second major issue. The retrieval, 
interpretation and analysis of data generated numerous difficulties and problems. 
Available data were scarce, and it is for this reason that some estimates date back to 
2010 (firearms), 2008 (counterfeiting) and 2007-2010 (waste). 
Third, the scarcity of data sometimes required the use of data on seizures and 
confiscations. These sources are particularly problematic, since they may frequently 
represent proxies for law enforcement activity/efficiency rather than for the illegal 
activities. Whenever possible, inspection was made of the distribution of such data to 
verify whether they were excessively biased towards measurement of law enforcement 
performance. For example, data on seized counterfeit goods were excluded from the 
analysis because they were more representative of the trend in controls than in 
counterfeiting itself.  
For the above reasons, estimation of the revenues from the four illegal markets 
was conducted with particular caution, and it always included a minimum and 
maximum estimate.  
Overall, these considerations suggest that the estimates should be treated as first 
attempts to measure a particularly obscure set of criminal activities. Future estimations 
will have to refine the methodologies and address the above-mentioned limitations in 
order to gain better understanding of these illegal markets and provide more precise 
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figures. Data availability and reliability will probably be the greatest challenge. 
Undoubtedly, new data are greatly needed to raise the accuracy of the estimations to the 
levels of those on other illegal activities. 
4. Results and discussion 
Table 3. Minimum and maximum estimates of the revenues of the markets for illegal 
firearms (year 2010), counterfeit goods (year 2008), gaming machines (year 2011) and 
special waste (years 2007-2010) (mn €). 
 Firearms Counterfeiting Gambling Waste 
 Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max 
Abruzzo 1.02 2.51 65.9 131.9 2.00 3.20 5.83 9.72 
Basilicata 0.72 1.99 22.3 44.5 6.62 10.58 2.65 4.41 
Calabria 2.58 7.78 79.7 159.4 21.15 33.83 4.65 7.76 
Campania 5.89 16.26 283.6 567.2 47.07 75.28 17.26 28.77 
Emilia-
Romagna 
2.68 6.81 248.5 497.1 4.41 7.06 22.12 36.87 
Friuli-V.G. 1.00 2.60 80.9 161.9 6.57 10.50 7.97 13.29 
Lazio 2.32 13.03 289.5 579.1 22.02 35.22 25.17 41.95 
Liguria 2.05 5.31 82.5 165.1 0.38 0.60 6.51 10.84 
Lombardy 3.57 11.01 514.3 1028.6 12.78 20.44 37.86 63.10 
Marche 1.05 3.00 68.6 137.1 2.13 3.41 12.42 20.71 
Molise 0.35 0.93 12.6 25.1 0.50 0.80 2.32 3.87 
Piedmont 2.41 7.67 197.2 394.5 44.85 71.72 17.13 28.54 
Apulia 4.16 15.85 171.2 342.4 40.60 64.92 24.95 41.58 
Sardinia 1.04 3.14 67.3 134.6 39.75 63.57 11.27 18.78 
Sicily 4.17 10.75 205.0 410.1 64.16 102.61 21.72 36.20 
Tuscany 4.36 12.11 189.2 378.4 6.46 10.32 37.92 63.19 
Trentino-A.A. 0.24 1.79 52.9 105.9 0.3 0.4 8.28 13.80 
Umbria 1.62 4.77 40.3 80.7 1.44 2.30 8.40 14.00 
Valle d'Aosta 0.03 0.12 5.3 10.7 1.20 1.92 0.53 0.88 
Veneto 4.78 13.46 350.5 700.9 2.60 4.16 29.05 48.42 
Italy 46.07 140.87 3027.5 6055.0 326.69 522.44 304.01 506.68 
Source: authors’ elaboration 
The estimated revenues from the illegal firearms market ranged between €46 mn 
and €141 mn in 2010 (Table 3). The minimum estimate is the result of the supply-based 
approach, while the demand-based approach provided higher values (between €70 and 
€141 mn, see also Table 4). In both cases, these figures are significantly lower than the 
estimates provided by previous studies, which have assessed the revenues of the illegal 
firearms market at between €2.9 and €5.8 bn (see 2). This remarkable discrepancy is 
difficult to explain in the absence of any information concerning the sources, 
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methodologies, and data used for the previous estimations. These figures appear to 
grossly overestimate the Italian illicit firearms market. As already mentioned, the total 
turnover of Italian firearms production (including ammunitions) was approximately 
€468 mn in 2010, of which only €115mn came from the domestic market. If correct, the 
estimations from the above-mentioned sources would make the illegal market 
approximately twenty-five to fifty times larger than the legal one. This consideration 
suggests that the previous sources may have merely reported such figures with no 
verification of their reliability.  
As regards the regional figures, the highest values are recorded among the most 
populated regions, which are also characterized by remarkable ratios of firearms 
seizures and confiscations. This is due to the methodological approach adopted for the 
estimation, which was based on the assumption that the illicit market is larger where 
there are more inhabitants and more firearms seized/confiscated. This may have 
determined only a rough representation of the actual revenues of the illegal firearms 
market across the Italian regions. Future studies should seek to improve this 
representation, possibly by gathering better empirical evidence on the concentration of 
the illicit firearms trade at the regional level. As already argued (see 3.5), data 
availability and reliability will raise the greatest challenges. 
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Figure 1 – Estimates of the revenues from the illegal firearms market by region (mn €). 
Year 2010. Absolute values and rates per 100,000 inhabitants. 
 
Source: authors’ elaboration 
The revenues of the market of counterfeit goods range between €3,028 mn (minimum) 
and €6,055 mn (maximum) in 2008 (Table 3). Overall, the figures are broadly 
comparable with previous estimates. The results are lower than the assessments by 
Confesercenti and CENSIS (€7,000-€8,000 mn), whereas they are almost in line with 
those of a study by the Guardia di Finanza which evaluated the counterfeit market at 
between €3,000 and €5,000 mn. It is difficult to explain the differences among these 
estimates owing to the lack of detailed information on the methodologies used by the 
previous studies. Despite these differences, in accordance with the findings in the 
literature, the sector yielding the highest illicit revenues is clothing, accessories and 
footwear, with a minimum estimate of €1,854 mn and a maximum estimate of € 3,708 
mn (Table 4). 
The regional figures seem to confirm that the illegal counterfeit market in Italy 
is widespread across the country. Taking the absolute values into account, the regions 
recording the highest estimates are Lombardy, Veneto, Campania and Lazio, whereas 
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according to the rate per 100,000 inhabitants the phenomenon is widespread across the 
entire country (Figure 2). In part, these results may be biased by the assumptions made 
for the estimation procedure. The regional figures are based on the number of 
employees in each sector and region, assuming that regions with the highest number of 
employees in one sector may also have a more prosperous and larger market in that 
sector, both legal and illegal. Further research should improve the distribution of the 
illicit revenues across regions, with better identification of the variables that can affect 
the counterfeit market at the local level. 
Figure 2 - Estimates of the revenues from the illegal counterfeit market by region (mn 
€). Year 2008. Absolute values and rates per 100,000 inhabitants. 
 
Source: authors’ elaboration 
The estimated revenues from illegal gambling machines ranged between €326 and €522 
mn in 2011 (Table 3). The figures are remarkably below the alleged revenues reported 
by other sources, which covered the entire illegal gambling sector (see above in 2.3). 
The difference may be due to a number of factors. 2011 was the first year in which a 
significant number of VLT machines were operational. These devices had better control 
systems and were more difficult to tamper with. Analysis of controls and seizures 
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suggests that irregularities have decreased with VLTs, and the estimated illegal 
revenues may have been higher in previous years. Moreover, the limited information on 
the methodology used by other sources suggests that these may have been based mostly 
on heterogeneous law enforcement and institutional material. Finally, the present study 
has only focused on a specific type of illegal gambling, excluding other potentially 
profitable subsectors (e.g. illegal football betting).  
In regard to the regional distribution, Southern regions, Piedmont and Valle 
d’Aosta have the highest rates, due to higher violations/controls ratios (Figure 3). For 
some traditional mafia regions this may be due to the presence of organized crime. The 
figure is more surprising in the case of Sardinia, which ranks first for illegal revenues 
(with a remarkably high violations/controls ratio, second only to Sicily). Further 
analyses should focus on these regions in order to identify and verify possible causes of 
the higher prevalence of illegal gambling. 
Figure 3 - Estimates of the revenues from illegal gaming machines by region (mn €). 
Year 2011. Absolute values and rates per 100,000 inhabitants. 
 
Source: authors’ elaboration 
The estimated national revenues from the illegal market of special waste range between 
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€304 and €507 mn (Table 3). The bulk of these revenues (between €279 and €466 mn) 
is attributable to non-hazardous waste. Conversely, hazardous waste generated illegal 
revenues amounting to between €25 and €41 mn (see Table 4). This disproportion 
reflects the methodological approach adopted for the estimation, which focused on the 
difference between legal waste production and management. Non-hazardous waste 
represented much the largest amount (around 92%) of the special waste produced in 
Italy in the time period considered. Accordingly, the corresponding revenues are higher 
than those from hazardous waste. 
The national figures are significantly lower than the estimates provided by 
previous studies (see 2.4). This discrepancy may be due to the fact that the previous 
estimates were based on legal prices of waste management and disposal. However, 
these prices are generally higher than those charged by the illegal market. At the same 
time, the illegal management and disposal of waste do not incur the same operating 
expenses as their legal counterparts.
114
 It can therefore be argued that large part of the 
estimated revenues from the illegal waste market result in direct profits for the illegal 
actors. Unfortunately, the actual scale of these profits is difficult to estimate owing to 
the lack of reliable data.  
The regional figures seem to confirm that the illegal waste market in Italy has 
extended nationwide (Figure 4). However, the estimation process “leveled out” the 
regional values on the basis of those in the macro-area or at national level, depending on 
the type of waste (see 3.4). This may have resulted in a poor representation of the actual 
levels of the illegal waste market across the Italian regions. Future research should 
address the limitations of the present study in order to provide better understanding of 
the regional distribution of illegal waste activities, as well as a first evaluation of the 
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profits associated with this market. Also for this illicit market, the greatest challenges 
will probably be data availability and reliability. 
Figure 4 - Estimates of the revenues from illegal waste market by region (mn €). 
Average years 2007-2010. Absolute values and rates per 100,000 inhabitants. 
 
Source: authors’ elaboration 
5. Conclusions 
This article has explored the possibilities of estimating four illegal markets, with the 
focus on Italy. Considering the lack of previous reliable assessments on any of these 
four criminal activities, this study should be treated as exploratory. Its goal has been to 
stimulate debate, at the international and national levels, on the frequently 
overestimated figures recurrently publicized by the media, and on the various ways to 
produce more reliable estimations.  
Despite the clear differences among the four markets analyzed in this study, 
there are common features in regard to estimation of their revenues. First, there is a 
remarkable absence of reliable data. The availability of seizure data does not solve the 
problem, since these data are not optimal for the measurement of criminal activities 
across different regions. They may depend more on the performance of, or the resources 
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available to, the law enforcement agencies, or on the entry points of illicit products. For 
this reason, the estimations excluded seizures and confiscations when estimating the 
total revenues for all four activities, except for the supply-based approach in the illicit 
firearms market. In some cases, seizures were used to distribute the criminal revenues at 
the regional level. Besides seizure data, there is a lack of yearly available and reliable 
data enabling measurement of the size of the illicit markets, with the possible exception 
of the tobacco industry’s empty pack surveys. Improvement of data collection is crucial 
for better and replicable estimates of the criminal markets. It is a necessary condition for 
monitoring their trends and measuring the efficiency of preventive and repressive 
policies.  
Second, despite the dearth of data, a number of different estimates of the four 
markets circulate in official reports and in the media. All these assessments lack details 
about the methodologies and the data used. This makes it very difficult to verify and 
compare these figures with the results of new studies. Furthermore, it raises suspicions 
as to their reliability, especially when the figures clearly overestimate the proceeds of 
these crimes. These figures are interesting examples of mythical numbers (i.e. 
overestimations of a social phenomenon with no empirical support, gaining authority 
due to repetition).
115
 In the criminal markets of this study, these numbers may be 
created no only by public agencies (e.g. law enforcement agencies seeking additional 
resources), but also by the legal industries (e.g. to get increased police attention and 
inflate the value of their brand). Particularly in the case of firearms and waste, the 
previous figures appear to be gross over-calculations of the sizes of the markets. For 
example, the alleged yearly revenues from illicit firearms trafficking would be between 
twenty-five and fifty times the national demand for firearms and ammunition from the 
legitimate market. This trend in the diffusion of unreliable estimates is problematic 
32 
 
because it contributes to the dissemination of stereotypes on the mafias. Like the lack of 
information, also the diffusion of wrong figures may jeopardize public and private 
action against the mafias and impair the allocation of law enforcement resources.  
In conclusion, while not claiming to provide definitive estimates, this study has 
adopted carefully described and replicable methodologies with which to measure the 
revenues of the illicit markets for firearms, counterfeits, gaming machines and special 
waste. This is a necessary step towards improving knowledge on these frequently 
debated, but rarely measured, criminal activities. 
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Appendix 
Table 4. Minimum and maximum estimates of the revenues of the markets for illegal firearms (year 2010), counterfeit goods (year 2008) and 
special waste (years 2007-2010) (mn €) per type of estimate or product/service. 
 Firearms Counterfeiting Special Waste 
 Supply Demand Clothing 
accessories and 
footwear 
Electrical 
equipment 
Information 
technology 
equipment 
CDs, DVDs, 
tapes 
Toys Glasses Watches and 
jewelry 
Fragrances and 
beauty 
Total Non-hazardous Hazardous Total 
 Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max 
Abruzzo 1.02 1.26 2.51 38.1 76.2 1.3 2.6 5.5 11.1 0.3 0.5 1.0 2.0 5.2 10.5 7.0 14.0 7.5 15.1 65.9 131.9 5.59 9.32 0.24 0.40 5.83 9.72 
Basilicata 0.72 0.99 1.99 14.2 28.5 0.8 1.7 2.1 4.1 0.1 0.2 0.7 1.4 0.9 1.8 2.2 4.4 1.2 2.4 22.3 44.5 2.49 4.15 0.16 0.26 2.65 4.41 
Calabria 2.58 3.89 7.78 52.4 104.7 2.2 4.3 7.2 14.4 0.3 0.7 1.6 3.1 2.6 5.2 8.0 16.0 5.5 11.0 79.7 159.4 4.43 7.38 0.23 0.38 4.65 7.76 
Campania 5.89 8.13 16.26 200.1 400.2 6.3 12.7 18.7 37.5 1.4 2.8 6.9 13.8 7.5 15.0 23.1 46.1 19.6 39.2 283.6 567.2 16.49 27.48 0.78 1.30 17.26 28.77 
Emilia-
Romagna 
2.68 3.41 6.81 138.8 277.5 3.5 6.9 24.0 47.9 1.2 2.4 4.6 9.1 32.8 65.5 16.1 32.2 27.7 55.5 248.5 497.1 19.97 33.29 2.15 3.58 22.12 36.87 
Friuli-V.G. 1.00 1.30 2.60 42.5 85.1 1.0 2.0 4.6 9.1 0.4 0.7 1.6 3.1 9.4 18.7 12.0 23.9 9.6 19.2 80.9 161.9 7.45 12.42 0.52 0.87 7.97 13.29 
Lazio 2.32 6.51 13.03 183.0 365.9 7.5 14.9 24.1 48.1 1.6 3.1 6.6 13.1 19.1 38.3 25.7 51.3 22.1 44.2 289.5 579.1 24.23 40.38 0.94 1.57 25.17 41.95 
Liguria 2.05 2.66 5.31 52.9 105.8 1.5 3.1 4.3 8.6 0.4 0.9 3.0 6.1 5.7 11.5 8.4 16.8 6.2 12.4 82.5 165.1 6.05 10.09 0.45 0.76 6.51 10.84 
Lombardy 3.57 5.50 11.01 316.6 633.2 15.6 31.2 25.9 51.7 1.8 3.7 20.4 40.9 57.4 114.7 38.8 77.6 37.9 75.7 514.3 1028.6 33.18 55.30 4.68 7.81 37.86 63.10 
Marche 1.05 1.50 3.00 45.9 91.7 1.0 2.1 4.0 7.9 0.3 0.7 1.4 2.9 5.8 11.5 5.5 11.0 4.7 9.3 68.6 137.1 12.12 20.20 0.30 0.50 12.42 20.71 
Molise 0.35 0.46 0.93 7.7 15.5 0.5 0.9 1.1 2.3 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.8 0.7 1.4 1.5 3.0 0.6 1.1 12.6 25.1 2.25 3.75 0.07 0.12 2.32 3.87 
Piedmont 2.41 3.84 7.67 128.2 256.4 3.2 6.5 14.2 28.5 1.3 2.5 5.0 9.9 16.0 32.0 17.8 35.5 11.6 23.2 197.2 394.5 15.26 25.43 1.86 3.11 17.13 28.54 
Apulia 4.16 7.92 15.85 109.4 218.8 5.0 10.0 16.4 32.7 0.7 1.5 4.6 9.2 8.8 17.6 14.0 28.0 12.4 24.8 171.2 342.4 24.34 40.56 0.61 1.01 24.95 41.58 
Sardinia 1.04 1.57 3.14 43.3 86.5 1.6 3.1 5.8 11.6 0.2 0.5 1.0 2.0 3.4 6.8 6.8 13.7 5.2 10.4 67.3 134.6 10.51 17.51 0.76 1.26 11.27 18.78 
Sicily 4.17 5.37 10.75 134.1 268.1 5.7 11.3 15.6 31.2 0.9 1.7 6.3 12.6 8.0 15.9 20.1 40.3 14.5 29.0 205.0 410.1 15.02 25.03 6.70 11.17 21.72 36.20 
Tuscany 4.36 6.06 12.11 120.8 241.7 4.9 9.9 12.8 25.7 1.1 2.3 4.9 9.8 11.7 23.4 18.1 36.2 14.8 29.5 189.2 378.4 36.85 61.42 1.06 1.77 37.92 63.19 
Trentino-
A.A. 
0.24 0.89 1.79 35.3 70.6 1.0 2.1 3.6 7.1 0.2 0.4 1.4 2.8 4.5 9.0 3.7 7.4 3.2 6.4 52.9 105.9 8.03 13.39 0.25 0.41 8.28 13.80 
Umbria 1.62 2.38 4.77 27.8 55.6 0.8 1.6 1.8 3.6 0.2 0.4 1.1 2.2 2.9 5.9 3.8 7.6 2.0 3.9 40.3 80.7 8.12 13.54 0.28 0.46 8.40 14.00 
Valle 
d'Aosta 
0.03 0.06 0.12 3.7 7.3 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.5 1.1 0.4 0.8 5.3 10.7 0.49 0.82 0.03 0.05 0.53 0.88 
Veneto 4.78 6.73 13.46 159.4 318.8 4.0 8.0 19.0 37.9 1.0 1.9 4.2 8.3 114.9 229.9 19.9 39.8 28.1 56.3 350.5 700.9 26.49 44.16 2.56 4.26 29.05 48.42 
Italy 46.07 70.44 140.87 1854.0 3708.0 67.4 134.9 210.8 421.5 13.5 27.1 76.7 153.4 317.5 635.0 252.9 505.9 234.6 469.3 3027.5 6055.0 279.37 465.61 24.64 41.06 304.01 506.68 
Source: authors’ elaboration 
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Trafficking: Networks and Logistics of Transnational Crime and International Terrorism. 
Considered here is only the black market. The distinction depends on four factors: the 
status of the buyer, the status of the seller, the status of the weapon, and the status of the 
transaction. See Ruggiero, “Criminals and Service Providers,” 32–33; Cukier, The Illicit 
Trade in Small Arms: Addressing the Problem of Diversion, 1. 
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